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RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
 The issue presented in this appeal is whether SB 2460, 
which the New Jersey Legislature enacted in 2014 (the “2014 
Law”) to partially repeal certain prohibitions on sports 
gambling, violates federal law.  2014 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 
Ch. 62, codified at N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 5:12A-7 to -9.  The 
District Court held that the 2014 Law violates the 
Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (“PASPA”), 
28 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3704.  We will affirm.  PASPA, by its 
terms, prohibits states from authorizing by law sports 
gambling, and the 2014 Law does exactly that.   
I. Background 
 Congress passed PASPA in 1992 to prohibit state-
sanctioned sports gambling.  PASPA provides: 
It shall be unlawful for— 
 
 (1) a governmental entity to 
sponsor, operate, advertise, promote, 
license, or authorize by law or compact, 
or 
 (2) a person to sponsor, operate, 
advertise, or promote, pursuant to the 
law or compact of a governmental entity, 
a lottery, sweepstakes, or other betting, 
gambling, or wagering scheme 
based . . . on one or more competitive 
games in which amateur or professional 
athletes participate, or are intended to 
participate, or on one or more 
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performances of such athletes in such 
games. 
 
28 U.S.C. § 3702 (emphasis added).  PASPA defines 
“governmental entity” to include states and their political 
subdivisions.  28 U.S.C. § 3701(2).  PASPA includes a 
remedial provision that permits any sports league whose 
games are or will be the subject of sports gambling to bring 
an action to enjoin the gambling.  28 U.S.C. § 3703.    
 
 Congress included in PASPA exceptions for state-
sponsored sports wagering in Nevada and sports lotteries in 
Oregon and Delaware, and also an exception for New Jersey 
but only if New Jersey were to enact a sports gambling 
scheme within one year of PASPA’s enactment.  28 U.S.C. 
§ 3704(a).  New Jersey did not do so and, thus, the PASPA 
exception expired.  Notably, sports gambling was prohibited 
in New Jersey for many years by statute and by the New 
Jersey Constitution.  See, e.g., N.J. Const. Art. IV § VII ¶ 2; 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:37-2; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:40-1.  In 
2010, however, the New Jersey Legislature held public 
hearings on the advisability of allowing sports gambling.  
These hearings included testimony that sports gambling 
would generate revenues for New Jersey’s struggling casinos 
and racetracks.  In 2011, the Legislature held a referendum 
asking New Jersey voters whether sports gambling should be 
permitted, and sixty-four percent voted in favor of amending 
the New Jersey Constitution to permit sports gambling.  The 
constitutional amendment provided:  
It shall also be lawful for the Legislature 
to authorize by law wagering at casinos 
or gambling houses in Atlantic City on 
the results of any professional, college, 
8 
 
or amateur sport or athletic event, except 
that wagering shall not be permitted on a 
college sport or athletic event that takes 
place in New Jersey or on a sport or 
athletic event in which any New Jersey 
college team participates regardless of 
where the event takes place . . . . 
 
N.J. Const. Art. IV, § VII, ¶ 2(D).  The amendment thus 
permitted the New Jersey Legislature to “authorize by law” 
sports wagering at “casinos or gambling houses in Atlantic 
City,” except that wagering was not permitted on New Jersey 
college teams or on any collegiate event occurring in New 
Jersey.  An additional section of the amendment permitted the 
Legislature to “authorize by law” sports wagering at “current 
or former running and harness horse racetracks,” subject to 
the same restrictions regarding New Jersey college teams and 
collegiate events occurring in New Jersey.  N.J. Const. Art. 
IV, § VII, ¶ 2(F).    
 
 After voters approved the sports-wagering 
constitutional amendment, the New Jersey Legislature 
enacted the Sports Wagering Act in 2012 (“2012 Law”), 
which provided for regulated sports wagering at New Jersey’s 
casinos and racetracks.  N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 5:12A-1 et seq. 
(2012).  The 2012 Law established a comprehensive 
regulatory scheme, requiring licenses for operators and 
individual employees, extensive documentation, minimum 
cash reserves, and Division of Gaming Enforcement access to 
security and surveillance systems.   
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 Five sports leagues1 sued to enjoin the 2012 Law as 
violative of PASPA.2  The New Jersey Parties did not dispute 
that the 2012 Law violated PASPA, but urged, instead, that 
PASPA was unconstitutional under the anti-commandeering 
doctrine.  The District Court held that PASPA was 
constitutional and enjoined implementation of the 2012 Law.  
                                              
1 The sports leagues were the National Collegiate Athletic 
Association (“NCAA”), National Football League (“NFL”), 
National Basketball Association, National Hockey League, 
and the Office of the Commissioner of Baseball, doing 
business as Major League Baseball (collectively, the 
“Leagues”). 
2 The Leagues named as defendants Christopher J. Christie, 
the Governor of the State of New Jersey; David L. Rebuck, 
the Director of the New Jersey Division of Gaming 
Enforcement (“DGE”) and Assistant Attorney General of the 
State of New Jersey; and Frank Zanzuccki, Executive 
Director of the New Jersey Racing Commission (“NJRC”).  
The New Jersey Thoroughbred Horsemen’s Association, Inc. 
(“NJTHA”) intervened as a defendant, as did Stephen M. 
Sweeney, President of the New Jersey Senate, and Sheila Y. 
Oliver, Speaker of the New Jersey General Assembly (“State 
Legislators”).  We collectively refer to these parties as the 
“New Jersey Parties.”  In the present case, the New Jersey 
Parties are the same, with some exceptions.  NJTHA was 
named as a defendant (i.e., it did not intervene), as was the 
New Jersey Sports and Exposition Authority; the latter is not 
participating in this appeal.  Additionally, Vincent Prieto, not 
Sheila Y. Oliver, is now the Speaker of the General 
Assembly. 
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The New Jersey Parties appealed, and we affirmed in 
National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of New 
Jersey, 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2013) (Christie I).   
 
 Christie I rejected the New Jersey Parties’ argument 
that PASPA was unconstitutional.  In explaining that PASPA 
does not commandeer the states’ legislative processes, we 
stated: “[n]othing in [PASPA’s] words requires that the states 
keep any law in place.  All that is prohibited is the issuance of 
gambling ‘license[s]’ or the affirmative ‘authoriz[ation] by 
law’ of gambling schemes.”  Id. at 232 (alterations in 
original).  The New Jersey Parties had urged that PASPA 
commandeered the state because it prohibited the repeal of 
New Jersey’s prohibitions on sports gambling; they reasoned 
that repealing a statute barring an activity would be 
equivalent to authorizing the activity, and “authorizing” was 
not allowed by PASPA.  We rejected that argument, 
observing that “PASPA speaks only of ‘authorizing by law’ a 
sports gambling scheme,” and “[w]e [did] not see how having 
no law in place governing sports wagering is the same as 
authorizing it by law.”  Id.  We further emphasized that “the 
lack of an affirmative prohibition of an activity does not mean 
it is affirmatively authorized by law.  The right to do that 
which is not prohibited derives not from the authority of the 
state but from the inherent rights of the people.”  Id.  In short, 
we concluded that the New Jersey Parties’ argument rested on 
a “false equivalence between repeal and authorization.”  Id. at 
233.    
 
 The New Jersey Parties appealed to the United States 
Supreme Court, which denied certiorari.  Christie I is now the 
law of the Circuit: PASPA is constitutional and does not 
violate the anti-commandeering doctrine.   
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 Undeterred, in 2014, the Legislature passed the 2014 
Law, SB 2460, which provided in part: 
 
any rules and regulations that may 
require or authorize any State agency to 
license, authorize, permit or otherwise 
take action to allow any person to engage 
in the placement or acceptance of any 
wager on any professional, collegiate, or 
amateur sport contest or athletic event, or 
that prohibit participation in or operation 
of a pool that accepts such wagers, are 
repealed to the extent they apply or may 
be construed to apply at a casino or 
gambling house operating in this State in 
Atlantic City or a running or harness 
horse racetrack in this State, to the 
placement and acceptance of wagers on 
professional, collegiate, or amateur sport 
contests or athletic events . . . . 
 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 5:12A-7.  The 2014 Law specifically 
prohibited wagering on New Jersey college teams’ 
competitions and on any collegiate competition occurring in 
New Jersey, and it limited sports wagering to “persons 21 
years of age or older situated at such location[s],” namely 
casinos and racetracks.  Id.  
II. Procedural History and Parties’ Arguments 
 The Leagues filed suit to enjoin the New Jersey Parties 
from giving effect to the 2014 Law.  The District Court held 
that the 2014 Law violates PASPA, granted summary 
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judgment in favor of the Leagues and issued a permanent 
injunction against the Governor of New Jersey, the Director 
of the New Jersey Division of Gaming Enforcement, and the 
Executive Director of the New Jersey Racing Commission 
(collectively, the “New Jersey Enjoined Parties”).3  The 
                                              
3 In the District Court, the New Jersey Enjoined Parties urged 
that the Eleventh Amendment gave them immunity such that 
they could not be sued in an action challenging the 2014 Law.  
The District Court rejected this argument, as do we, and we 
note that, while the issue was briefed, the New Jersey 
Enjoined Parties did not press—or even mention—this issue 
at oral argument.  They contend that, because the 2014 Law is 
a self-executing repeal that requires no action from them or 
any other state official, they are immune from suit.  This 
argument fails.  The New Jersey Enjoined Parties are subject 
to suit under the Ex parte Young exception to Eleventh 
Amendment immunity, which “permit[s] the federal courts to 
vindicate federal rights and hold state officials responsible to 
‘the supreme authority of the United States.’”  Pennhurst 
State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 105 (1984) 
(quoting Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 160 (1908)).  The 
New Jersey Enjoined Parties are not arguing that other state 
officials should have been named instead of them; they are 
arguing that no state official can be sued regarding the 2014 
Law.  We disagree.  The Leagues named the state officials 
who are most closely connected to the 2014 Law, i.e., the 
Governor, the Director of the DGE, and the Executive 
Director of the NJRC.  The Leagues did not name officials 
who bear no connection whatsoever to the 2014 Law.  See 
Young, 209 U.S. at 156 (explaining that plaintiffs cannot 
name just any state official, such as a “state superintendent of 
schools” simply “to test the constitutionality” of a law).  See 
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District Court interpreted Christie I as holding that PASPA 
offers two choices to states: maintaining prohibitions on 
sports gambling or completely repealing them.  It reasoned 
that PASPA preempts the 2014 Law because the 2014 Law is 
a partial repeal that necessarily results in sports wagering with 
the State’s imprimatur.  The New Jersey Parties appealed.   
 
 On appeal, the New Jersey Parties argue that the 2014 
Law complies with PASPA and is consistent with Christie I 
because the New Jersey Legislature effected a repealer as 
Christie I specifically permitted.  The NJTHA argues that the 
District Court erred in granting injunctive relief to the 
Leagues because the Leagues have unclean hands from 
supporting sports gambling in other contexts, and that any 
injunctive relief should be limited to the Leagues’ games and 
should not include games of entities who are not parties to 
this action.   
 
 The Leagues urge that the 2014 Law violates PASPA 
because it “authorizes” and “licenses” sports gambling.  The 
United States submitted an amicus brief in support of the 
Leagues arguing that the 2014 Law impermissibly “licenses” 
sports wagering by confining the repeal of gambling 
prohibitions to licensed gambling facilities and thus, in effect, 
enlarging the terms of existing gaming licenses.   
                                                                                                     
also Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1208 (3d Cir. 
1988) (noting that a suit against the governor would be 
appropriate when challenging a “self-enforcing statute” 
because “[t]he plaintiff would have been barred from 
challenging the statute by the eleventh amendment unless it 
could name the Governor as a defendant”).   
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 We conclude that the District Court did not err in 
striking down the 2014 Law.  
III. Analysis4 
A. The 2014 Law Violates PASPA 
 As a preliminary matter, we acknowledge New 
Jersey’s salutary purpose in attempting to legalize sports 
gambling to revive its troubled casino and racetrack 
industries.  The New Jersey Assembly Gaming and Tourism 
Committee chairman stated, in regards to the 2014 Law, that 
“[w]e want to give the racetracks a shot in the arm.  We want 
to help Atlantic City.  We want to do something for the 
gaming business in the state of New Jersey, which has been 
under tremendous duress . . . .”  (App. 91.)  New Jersey State 
Senator Ray Lesniak, a sponsor of the law, has likewise stated 
that “[s]ports betting will be a lifeline to the casinos, putting 
people to work and generating economic activity in a growth 
industry.”  (App. 94.)  And New Jersey State Senator Joseph 
Kyrillos stated that “New Jersey’s continued prohibition on 
sports betting at our casinos and racetracks is contrary to our 
interest of supporting employers that provide tens of 
thousands of jobs and add billions to our state’s economy” 
and that “[s]ports betting will help set New Jersey’s wagering 
facilities apart from the competition and strengthen 
                                              
4 “We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de 
novo . . . .”  Viera v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 642 F.3d 407, 
413 (3d Cir. 2011).  “We review a district court’s grant of a 
permanent injunction for abuse of discretion.”  Meyer v. 
CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc’y, 648 F.3d 154, 162 (3d Cir. 2011). 
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Monmouth Park and our struggling casino industry.”  (App. 
138.)  PASPA has clearly stymied New Jersey’s attempts to 
revive its casinos and racetracks and provide jobs for its 
workforce.   
 
 Moreover, PASPA is not without its critics, even aside 
from its economic impact.  It has been criticized for 
prohibiting an activity, i.e., sports gambling, that its critics 
view as neither immoral nor dangerous.  It has also been 
criticized for encouraging the spread of illegal sports 
gambling and for making it easier to fix games, since it 
precludes the transparency that accompanies legal activities.5  
Simply put, “[w]e are cognizant that certain questions related 
to this case—whether gambling on sporting events is harmful 
to the games’ integrity and whether states should be permitted 
to license and profit from the activity—engender strong 
views.”  Christie I, 730 F.3d at 215.  While PASPA’s 
provisions and its reach are controversial and, some might 
say, unwise, “we are not asked to judge the wisdom of 
PASPA” and “[i]t is not our place to usurp Congress’ role 
simply because PASPA may have become an unpopular law.”  
Id. at 215, 241.  We echo Christie I in noting that “New 
Jersey and any other state that may wish to legalize gambling 
                                              
5 It has also been criticized as unconstitutional, but we held 
otherwise in Christie I and we cannot and will not revisit that 
determination here.  See Christie I, 730 F.3d at 240 
(“[N]othing in PASPA violates the U.S. Constitution.  The 
law neither exceeds Congress’ enumerated powers nor 
violates any principle of federalism implicit in the Tenth 
Amendment or anywhere else in our Constitutional 
structure.”).  
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on sports . . . are not left without redress. Just as PASPA once 
gave New Jersey preferential treatment in the context of 
gambling on sports, Congress may again choose to do so 
or . . . may choose to undo PASPA altogether.”  Id. at 240-41.  
Unless or until that happens, however, we are duty-bound to 
interpret the text of the law as Congress wrote it.   
 
 We now turn to the primary question before us: 
whether the 2014 Law violates PASPA.  We hold that it does.  
Under PASPA, it shall be unlawful for “a governmental entity 
to sponsor, operate, advertise, promote, license, or authorize 
by law or compact” sports gambling.  28 U.S.C. § 3702(1).  
We conclude that the 2014 Law violates PASPA because it 
authorizes by law sports gambling.   
 
 First, the 2014 Law authorizes casinos and racetracks 
to operate sports gambling while other laws prohibit sports 
gambling by all other entities.  Without the 2014 Law, the 
sports gambling prohibitions would apply to casinos and 
racetracks.  Appellants urge that the 2014 Law does not 
provide authority for sports gambling because we previously 
held that “[t]he right to do that which is not prohibited derives 
not from the authority of the state but from the inherent rights 
of the people” and that “[w]e do not see how having no law in 
place governing sports wagering is the same as authorizing it 
by law.” Christie I, 730 F.3d at 232.  But this is not a 
situation where there are no laws governing sports gambling 
in New Jersey.  Absent the 2014 Law, New Jersey’s myriad 
laws prohibiting sports gambling would apply to the casinos 
and racetracks.  Thus, the 2014 Law provides the 
authorization for conduct that is otherwise clearly and 
completely legally prohibited.   
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 Second, the 2014 Law authorizes sports gambling by 
selectively dictating where sports gambling may occur, who 
may place bets in such gambling, and which athletic contests 
are permissible subjects for such gambling.  Under the 2014 
Law, New Jersey’s sports gambling prohibitions are 
specifically removed from casinos, gambling houses, and 
horse racetracks as long as the bettors are people age 21 or 
over, and as long as there are no bets on either New Jersey 
college teams or collegiate competitions occurring in New 
Jersey.  The word “authorize” means, inter alia, “[t]o 
empower; to give a right or authority to act,” or “[t]o permit a 
thing to be done in the future.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 133 
(6th ed. 1990).6  The 2014 Law allows casinos and racetracks 
and their patrons to engage, under enumerated circumstances, 
in conduct that other businesses and their patrons cannot do.  
That selectiveness constitutes specific permission and 
empowerment.   
 
 Appellants place much stock in our statement in 
Christie I that their argument there rested on a “false 
equivalence between repeal and authorization.”  730 F.3d at 
233.  They claim that the 2014 Law does not authorize sports 
gambling because it is only a “repeal” and, in Christie I, we 
stated that “the lack of an affirmative prohibition of an 
activity does not mean it is affirmatively authorized by law.”  
Id. at 232.  In other words, they argue that, because the 2014 
Law is only a repeal removing prohibitions against sports 
gambling, it is not an “affirmative authorization” under 
Christie I.  We agree that, had the 2014 Law repealed all 
                                              
6 We cite the version of Black’s Law Dictionary that was in 
effect in 1992, the year PASPA was passed.   
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prohibitions on sports gambling, we would be hard-pressed, 
given Christie I, to find an “authorizing by law” in violation 
of PASPA.  But that is not what occurred here.  The presence 
of the word “repeal” does not prevent us from examining 
what the provision actually does, and the Legislature’s use of 
the term does not change the fact that the 2014 Law 
selectively grants permission to certain entities to engage in 
sports gambling.  New Jersey’s sports gambling prohibitions 
remain and no one may engage in such conduct save those 
listed by the 2014 Law.  While artfully couched in terms of a 
repealer, the 2014 Law essentially provides that, 
notwithstanding any other prohibition by law, casinos and 
racetracks shall hereafter be permitted to have sports 
gambling.  This is not a repeal; it is an authorization. 
 
 Third, the exception in PASPA for New Jersey, which 
New Jersey did not take advantage of before the one-year 
time limit expired, is remarkably similar to the 2014 Law.  
The exception states that PASPA does not apply to “a betting, 
gambling, or wagering scheme . . . conducted exclusively in 
casinos . . . , but only to the extent that . . . any commercial 
casino gaming scheme was in operation . . . throughout the 
10-year period” before PASPA was enacted.  28 U.S.C. 
§ 3704(a)(3)(B).  The exception would have permitted sports 
gambling at New Jersey’s casinos, which is just what the 
2014 Law does.  We can easily infer that, by explicitly 
excepting a scheme of sports gambling in New Jersey’s 
casinos from PASPA’s prohibitions, Congress intended that 
such a scheme would violate PASPA.  If Congress had not 
perceived that sports gambling in New Jersey’s casinos would 
violate PASPA, then it would not have needed to insert the 
New Jersey exception.  In other words, if sports gambling in 
New Jersey’s casinos does not violate PASPA, then PASPA’s 
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one-year exception for New Jersey would have been 
superfluous.  We will not read statutory provisions to be 
surplusage.  See Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 133 S. Ct. 
1166, 1178 (2013) (“[T]he canon against surplusage is 
strongest when an interpretation would render superfluous 
another part of the same statutory scheme.”).  In order to 
avoid rendering the New Jersey exception surplusage, we 
must read the 2014 Law as authorizing a scheme that clearly 
violates PASPA.7    
 
 As support for their argument that the 2014 Law does 
not violate PASPA, Appellants cite the 2014 Law’s 
construction provision, which provides that “[t]he provisions 
of this act . . . are not intended and shall not be construed as 
causing the State to sponsor, operate, advertise, promote, 
license, or authorize by law or compact” sports wagering.  
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 5:12A-8.  This conveniently mirrors 
PASPA’s language providing that states may not “sponsor, 
operate, advertise, promote, license, or authorize by law or 
compact” sports wagering.  28 U.S.C. § 3702(1).   
 The construction provision does not save the 2014 
Law.  States may not use clever drafting or mandatory 
construction provisions to escape the supremacy of federal 
law.  Cf. Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 742 (2009) 
(“[T]he Supremacy Clause cannot be evaded by formalism.”); 
                                              
7 Granted, the 2014 Law applies to horse racetracks as well as 
casinos, while the PASPA exception for New Jersey refers 
only to casinos, but that does not change the significance of 
the New Jersey exception because it refers to gambling in 
places that already allow gambling, and the racetracks fall 
within that rubric. 
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Howlett ex rel. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 382-83 (1990) 
(“[t]he force of the Supremacy Clause is not so weak that it 
can be evaded by mere mention of” a particular word).  In the 
same vein, the New Jersey Legislature cannot use a targeted 
construction provision to limit the reach of PASPA or to 
dictate to a court a construction that would limit that reach.  
The 2014 Law violates PASPA, and the construction 
provision cannot alter that fact.   
 
 Appellants also draw a comparison between the 2014 
Law and the 2012 Law, which involved a broad regulatory 
scheme, as evidence that the 2014 Law does not violate 
PASPA.  It is true that the 2014 Law does not set forth a 
comprehensive scheme or provide for a state regulatory role, 
as the 2012 Law did.  However, PASPA does not limit its 
reach to active state involvement or regulation of sports 
gambling.  It prohibits a range of state activity, the least 
intrusive of which is “authorization” by law of sports 
gambling. 
 
 We conclude that the 2014 Law violates PASPA 
because it authorizes by law sports gambling.8   
                                              
8 Because we conclude that the 2014 Law authorizes by law 
sports gambling, we need not address the argument made by 
Appellees and Amicus that the 2014 Law also licenses sports 
gambling by permitting only those entities that already have 
gambling licenses or recently had such licenses to conduct 
sports gambling operations.  We also do not address the 
argument of the State Legislators and the NJTHA that, to the 
extent that any aspect of the 2014 Law violates PASPA, we 
should apply the 2014 Law’s severability clause.  The State 
Legislators and the NJTHA offer no proposals regarding what 
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B. Injunctive Relief 
 The NJTHA argues that the injunction should apply 
only to the parties who brought this suit and that gambling on 
the athletic contests of other entities, who are not parties to 
this suit, should be permitted.  But PASPA does not limit its 
prohibition to sports gambling involving only entities who 
actually bring suit.  PASPA provides that “[a] civil action to 
enjoin a violation of section 3702 . . . may be 
commenced . . . by a professional sports organization or 
amateur sports organization whose competitive game is 
alleged to be the basis of such violation.”  28 U.S.C. § 3703.  
The NJTHA conflates the Leagues’ right to bring suit with 
the remedy they may obtain.  PASPA provides that the 
Leagues may “enjoin a violation of section 3702,” without 
any limiting language.  The 2014 Law violates PASPA in all 
contexts, not simply as applied to the Leagues, and, therefore, 
the District Court properly enjoined its application in full.   
 
 Finally, we need not dwell on the NJTHA’s argument 
that the Leagues should not be entitled to equitable relief 
because they have unclean hands.  The NJTHA contends that 
the Leagues are essentially hypocrites because they encourage 
and profit from sports betting, noting that the NFL has been 
scheduling games in London where sports gambling is legal, 
that the NCAA holds events in Las Vegas where sports 
gambling is legal, and that the Leagues sanction and 
encourage fantasy sports betting.  These allegations fail to 
rise to the level required for application of the unclean hands 
doctrine.  “The equitable doctrine of unclean hands applies 
                                                                                                     
provisions should be severed from the 2014 Law, and we do 
not see how we could sever it. 
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when a party seeking relief has committed an unconscionable 
act immediately related to the equity the party seeks in 
respect to the litigation.”  Highmark, Inc. v. UPMC Health 
Plan, Inc., 276 F.3d 160, 174 (3d Cir. 2001).  It is not 
“unconscionable” for the Leagues to support fantasy sports 
and hold events in Las Vegas or London, nor is doing so 
“immediately related” to the 2014 Law.  We cannot conclude 
that the Leagues acted unconscionably, i.e., amorally, 
abusively, or with extreme unfairness, in relation to the 2014 
Law.   
IV. Conclusion 
 The 2014 Law violates PASPA because it authorizes 
by law sports gambling.  We will affirm. 
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FUENTES, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 In response to Christie I, where we held that New 
Jersey’s 2012 Sports Wagering Law (“2012 Law”) violated 
PASPA, the New Jersey Legislature passed the 2014 Law.  In 
addition to repealing the 2012 Law in full, the 2014 Law also 
repealed all prohibitions on sports wagering and any rules 
authorizing the State to, among other things, license or 
authorize a person to engage in sports wagering, with respect 
to casinos and gambling houses in Atlantic City and horse 
racetracks in New Jersey.  The repealer also maintained 
prohibitions for persons under 21 and for wagering on New 
Jersey collegiate teams or any collegiate competition 
occurring in New Jersey.  Likewise, the 2014 Law stripped 
New Jersey of any involvement in sports wagering, regulatory 
or otherwise.  In essence, the 2014 Law renders previous 
prohibitions on sports gambling non-existent.   
 The majority, however, takes issue with what it terms 
the “selective” nature of the partial repeal.  First, that the 
repeal applies to specific locations.  That is, under the 2014 
Law, wagering may only take place at casinos, gambling 
houses, and horse racetracks.  Next, the restriction against 
betting by persons under the age of 21 would remain, and 
finally, restrictions against betting on New Jersey collegiate 
teams or any collegiate competition in New Jersey would 
remain.  These restrictions, the majority concludes, amount to 
“authorizing” a sports-wagering scheme and, therefore, the 
2014 Law must also violate PASPA.  I disagree.  As I see it, 
the issue is whether a partial repeal amounts to authorization.  
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Because this logic rests on the same false equivalence1 we 
rejected in Christie I, I respectfully dissent. 
 The majority, however, maintains that the 2014 Law 
“authorizes” casinos and racetracks to operate sports 
gambling while other laws prohibit sports gambling by all 
other entities.2  According to the majority, “this is not a 
situation where there are no laws governing sports gambling 
in New Jersey” and “[a]bsent the 2014 Law, New Jersey’s 
myriad laws prohibiting sports gambling would apply to the 
casinos and racetracks.”3  Yet, the majority is mistaken as to 
the impact of a partial repeal.  Repeal is defined as to 
“rescind” or “an abrogation of an existing law by legislative 
act.”4  When a statute is repealed, “the repealed statute, in 
                                              
1 A false equivalence is a logical fallacy which describes a 
situation where there is a logical and apparent equivalence, 
but when in fact there is none.  This fallacy is categorized as a 
fallacy of inconsistency.  Harry Phillips & Patricia Bostian, 
The Purposeful Argument: A Practical Guide, Brief Edition 
129 (2014).  In Christie I, we held that there was a false 
equivalence between repeal and authorization.  730 F.3d at 
233.   
2 For brevity, I refer to the repeal of prohibitions as applying 
to casinos, gambling houses, and horse racetracks, with the 
understanding that the repeal applies to casinos and gambling 
houses in Atlantic City and horse racetracks in New Jersey 
for those over 21 not betting on New Jersey collegiate teams 
or any collegiate competition occurring in New Jersey.  
3 Maj. Op. 16-17. 
4 Black’s Law Dictionary 1325 (8th ed. 2007). 
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regard to its operative effect, is considered as if it had never 
existed.”5  A repealed statute is treated as if it never existed; a 
partially repealed statute is treated as if only the remaining 
part exists.6 
 The 2014 Law, then, renders the previous prohibitions 
on sports gambling non-existent.  After the repeal, it is as if 
New Jersey never prohibited sports gambling in casinos, 
gambling houses, and horse racetracks.  Therefore, with 
respect to those areas, there are no laws governing sports 
wagering and the right to engage in such conduct does not 
                                              
5 73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes § 264. 
6 See, e.g., Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 514 (1868) 
(“[W]hen an act of the legislature is repealed, it must be 
considered . . . as if it never existed.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); Anderson v. USAir, Inc., 818 F.2d 49, 55 
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (“Common sense dictates that repeal means 
a deletion.  This court would engage in pure speculation were 
it to hold otherwise.”); In re Black, 225 B.R. 610, 620 (Bankr. 
M.D. La. 1998) (“Can a statute use a repealed statute?  Is a 
repealed statute something or is it nothing?  We think the 
answers are ‘no’ and ‘nothing.’”); Kemp by Wright v. State, 
687 A.2d 715, 723 (N.J. 1997) (“In this State it is the general 
rule that where a statute is repealed and there is no saving[s] 
clause or a general statute limiting the effect of the repeal, the 
repealed statute . . . is considered as though it had never 
existed, except as to matters and transactions passed and 
closed.” (quoting Parsippany Hills Assocs. v. Rent Leveling 
Bd. of Parsippany-Troy Hills Twp., 476 A.2d 271, 275 (N.J. 
Super. 1984)). 
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come from the state.  Rather, the right to do that which is not 
prohibited stems from the inherent rights of the people.7  The 
majority, however, states that “[a]bsent the 2014 Law, New 
Jersey’s myriad laws prohibiting sports gambling would 
apply to the casinos and racetracks,” and that, as such, “the 
2014 Law provides the authorization for conduct that is 
otherwise clearly and completely legally prohibited.”8  We 
have refuted this position before.  In Christie I, we held that 
“the lack of an affirmative prohibition of an activity does not 
mean it is affirmatively authorized by law.”9  Such an 
argument, we said, “rests on a false equivalence between 
repeal and authorization and reads the term ‘by law’ out of 
the statute.”10  We identified several problems in making this 
false equivalence—the most troublesome being that it “reads 
the term ‘by law’ out of the statute.”11  The majority’s 
position does just that.  In holding that a partial repeal of 
prohibitions is state authorization, the majority must infer 
authorization.  PASPA, however, contemplates more.  In 
Christie I, we pointed to the fact that New Jersey’s 2012 
amendment to its constitution, which gave the Legislature 
power to “authorize by law” sports wagering was insufficient 
to “authorize [it] by law.”12  We explained, “that the 
Legislature needed to enact the [2012 Law] itself belies any 
                                              
7 Christie I, 730 F.3d at 232. 
8 Maj. Op. 16-17. 
9 Christie I, 730 F.3d at 232.   
10 Id. at 233.   
11 Id. 
12 Id. at 232. 
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contention that the mere repeal of New Jersey’s ban on sports 
gambling was sufficient to ‘authorize [it] by law’ . . . . [T]he . 
. . Legislature itself saw a meaningful distinction between 
repealing the ban on sports wagering and authorizing it by 
law, undermining any contention that the amendment alone 
was sufficient to affirmatively authorize sports wagering.”13  
This is no less true of a partial repeal than it would be of a 
total repeal—which the majority concedes would not violate 
PASPA.  Thus, to reach the conclusion that the 2014 Law, a 
partial repeal of prohibitions, authorizes sports wagering, the 
majority necessarily relies on this false equivalence.  It 
concedes as much when stating “the 2014 Law” (the repeal) 
provides “the authorization” for sports wagering.  Of course, 
this is the exact false equivalence we identified, and 
dismissed as a logical fallacy, in Christie I.14    
 The majority does not believe it makes this false 
equivalence.  To support its position, the majority relies on 
the “selective” nature of the 2014 Law contending that “the 
Legislature’s use of the term [‘repeal’] does not change the 
fact that the 2014 Law selectively grants permission to certain 
entities to engage in sports gambling.”15  First, it does not.  
There is no explicit grant of permission in the 2014 Law for 
any entity to engage in sports wagering.  Second, not only 
does the majority fail to explain why such a partial repeal is 
equivalent to granting permission (by law) for these locations, 
but the very logic of such a position fails.  If withdrawing 
prohibitions on “some” sports wagering is the equivalent to 
                                              
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 233.   
15 Maj. Op. 18. 
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authorization by law, then withdrawing prohibitions on all 
sports wagering must be considered authorization by law.16  
Under this logic, New Jersey is left with no choice at all—it 
must uphold all prohibitions on sports wagering in perpetuity 
or until PASPA is no more.  This is precisely the opposite of 
what we held in Christie I—“[n]othing in these words 
requires that the states keep any law in place”17—and why we 
found PASPA did not violate the anti-commandeering 
principle. 
 The majority, along with the United States, conceded 
that a complete repeal does not violate PASPA.  Indeed, in its 
brief in opposition to New Jersey’s petition for certiorari, the 
United States went as far as to concede that New Jersey could 
repeal its prohibitions in whole or in part.18  Simply put, there 
is nothing special about a partial repeal and it, too, does not 
violate PASPA.  The 2014 Law is a self-executing 
deregulatory measure that repeals existing prohibitions and 
regulations for sports wagering and requires the State to 
abdicate any control or involvement in sports wagering.  I do 
                                              
16 Put another way, would a state violate PASPA if it enacted 
a complete repeal of sports-wagering prohibitions and later 
enacted limited prohibitions regarding age requirements and 
places where wagering could occur?  There is simply no 
conceivable reading of PASPA that could preclude a state 
from restricting sports wagering. 
17 730 F.3d at 232. 
18 Br. for the United States in Opp’n at 11, Christie v. Nat’l 
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, Nos. 13-967, 13-979, and 13980 
(U.S. May 14, 2014).   
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not see, then, how the majority concludes that the 2014 Law 
authorizes sports wagering, much less in violation of PASPA. 
 The majority equally falters when it analogizes the 
2014 Law to the exception Congress originally offered to 
New Jersey in 1992.  The exception stated that PASPA did 
not apply to “a betting, gambling, or wagering scheme . . . 
conducted exclusively in casinos[,] . . . but only to the extent 
that . . . any commercial casino gaming scheme was in 
operation . . . throughout the 10-year period” before PASPA 
was enacted.19  Setting aside the most obvious distinction 
between the 2014 Law and the 1992 exception, that it 
contemplated a scheme that the 2014 Law does not 
authorize,20 the majority misses the mark with this 
comparison when it states: “If Congress had not perceived 
that sports gambling in New Jersey’s casinos would violate 
PASPA, then it would not have needed to insert the New 
                                              
19 28 U.S.C. § 3704(a)(3)(B). 
20 For example, “[Division of Gaming Enforcement (“DGE”)] 
now considers sports wagering to be ‘non-gambling activity’ . 
. . that is beyond DGE’s control and outside of DGE’s 
regulatory authority.”  App. 416.  At oral argument, 
Appellants conceded they would have no authority or 
jurisdiction over sports wagering.  See, e.g., Tr. 14:12-15 (“Q: 
Sports betting is going to take place in the casino with no 
oversight whatsoever; A: That’s right.”); Tr. 21:15-20 (“All 
of the state and federal laws that deal with consumer 
protection, criminal penalties and the like remain in full force 
and effect at the sports betting venue. The only thing that 
doesn't get regulated is the sports betting itself.”).  
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Jersey exception.”21  Congress, however, did not perceive, or 
intend, for private sports wagering in casinos to violate 
PASPA.  Instead, Congress prohibited sports wagering 
pursuant to state law.  That the 2014 Law might bring about 
an increase in the amount of private, legal sports wagering in 
New Jersey is of no moment and the majority’s reliance on 
such a possibility is misplaced.  The majority is also wrong in 
an even more fundamental way: the exception Congress 
offered to New Jersey was exactly that, an exception to the 
proscriptions of PASPA.  That is to say, with this exception, 
New Jersey could have “sponsor[ed], operate[d], advertise[d], 
promote[d], license[d], or authorize[d] by law or compact” 
sports wagering.  Under the 2014 Law, of course, New Jersey 
cannot and does not aim to do any of these things. 
 The majority fails to illustrate how the 2014 Law 
results in sports wagering pursuant to state law when there is 
no law in place as to several locations, no scheme created, 
and no state involvement.  A careful comparison to the 2012 
Law is instructive.  The 2012 Law lifted New Jersey’s ban on 
sports wagering and provided for the licensing of sports-
wagering pools at casinos and racetracks in the State.  Indeed, 
New Jersey set up a comprehensive regime for the licensing 
and close supervision and regulation of sports-wagering 
pools.  For instance, the 2012 Law required any entity that 
wished to operate a “sports pool lounge” to acquire a “sports 
pool license.”  To do so, a prospective operator was required 
to pay a $50,000 application fee, secure DGE approval of all 
internal controls, and ensure that any of its employees who 
were to be directly involved in sports wagering obtained 
individual licenses from DGE and the Casino Control 
                                              
21 Maj. Op. 19.   
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Commission.  In addition, the regime required entities to, 
among other things, submit extensive documentation to DGE, 
to adopt new “house” rules subject to DGE approval, and to 
conform to DGE standards.  This violated PASPA in the most 
basic way: New Jersey developed an intricate scheme to both 
authorize (by law) and license sports gambling.  The 2014 
Law repealed this entire scheme. 
 Without more, the majority is simply left calling a tail 
a leg—which, as the adage goes, does not make it so.  
Because I do not see how a partial repeal of prohibitions is 
tantamount to “authorizing by law” a sports-wagering scheme 
in violation of PASPA, I respectfully dissent.  
